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he code of conduct that was agreed by a cross-party working group of the European Parliament (EP), the EP 
Bureau and Conference of Presidents, is a watered-down compromise that lacks provision for the introduction 
of the ‘legislative footprint’ that the plenary requested the Bureau to set up. The legislative footprint is a 
document that would detail the time, person and subject of a legislator’s contact with a stakeholder. Published as an 
annex to legislative reports, it would provide insight into who gave input into draft legislation. Unfortunately, the 
Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee with Carlo Casini (EPP) as Chair and Rapporteur has so far failed to 
improve the draft in this respect. Against a backdrop of past scandals and recent criticism of early agreements 
negotiated in trilogues behind closed doors, the EP is about to miss an opportunity to show that it has learnt its 
lesson, and that it takes seriously its role as guarantor of legitimacy in EU decision-making. Transparency means 
proactive action: by adding a provision for a legislative footprint that identifies the interest representatives with 
whom key actors met and from whom they received advice, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have a 
chance to turn the EP into a role model for parliamentary transparency in a pluralistic democracy.  
 
n the spring of this year, the EP was rocked by 
a  bribery  scandal.  Sunday  Times  journalists 
posing  as  lobbyists  had  offered  money  to 
MEPs in exchange for legislative favours, such as 
the introduction of amendments. Three of them 
showed receptiveness to the offers. When the trap 
and the true identities were uncovered, two of the 
three MEPs resigned and one was pressured into 
leaving his party group, while clinging on to his 
seat.1  While no parliament is immune to such 
                                                       
1  Euractiv,  “Journalistic  spoof  traps  MEPs  in  bribery 
affair”, 29 March 2011 (tinyurl.com/EPspoof); C. Bryant 
and  J.  Chaffin  (2011),  “MEP  resigns  over  claims  of 
lobbyist  payments”,  Financial  Times,  20  March  2011, 
(tinyurl.com/EPresignation); The Economist, “Corruption 
allegations  in  the  European  Parliament:  He  won't  back 
down”, 24 March 2011, (tinyurl.com/EPSeverin). 
individual unethical behaviour, the EP vowed to 
review  its  procedures,  and  to  become  more 
transparent in its dealings with lobbyists.2  
In plenary, President Buzek declared,  
As  President  elected  by  you,  ladies  and 
gentlemen,  I  am  determined  to  uphold  the 
integrity of this House and all its Members. I 
would like to remind you of the great public 
responsibility resting on us as representatives 
elected  by  the  people.  The  citizens  have 
entrusted  us  with  the  right  to  exercise 
                                                       
2 European Parliament, “EP leaders agree to develop new 
rules  for  lobbyists  and  stronger  code  for  MEPs”,  press 
release (tinyurl.com/EPleaders); A. Willis (2011), “Buzek 
defends  parliament's  efforts  to  tighten  internal  rules”, 
EUObserver, 23 May 2011 (euobserver.com/9/32379) 
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authority  on  their  behalf.  We  must  not 
disappoint that trust.3  
Admittedly, MEPs have a lot on their plate at the 
moment in dealing with urgent legislative activity 
on  the  economic  and  financial  crisis.  These 
activities,  however,  are  distracting  them  from 
more  long-term  issues  that  are  crucial  to  the 
development  of  a  more  democratic  and 
transparent European Union. The EP, as directly 
elected co-legislator of the member states in the 
Council, has traditionally waved the flag for open 
deliberation  and  legitimacy  in  EU  decision-
making. While the EP‟s powers were boosted by 
the Lisbon Treaty, the legitimacy of its decision-
making,  with  many  agreements  concluded  in 
trilogues  behind  closed  doors,  has  come  under 
scrutiny and criticism.  
These  developments  placed the  ball  in the  EP‟s 
court.  So  far,  we  can  distinguish  two  concrete 
initiatives  on  the  part  of  the  Parliament  to 
enhance transparency and, hence, legitimacy. But 
they only go half way.4 
Transparency register and code of 
conduct not enough 
First,  the  incident  gave  momentum  to  the 
Transparency  register, which was adopted  by a 
large majority of MEPs in May 2011, after more 
than two years of discussions, and which is now 
up  and  running.5  Lobbyists  need  to  make 
comprehensive  information  available  on  their 
affiliation,  the  turnover  and  clients  of  the 
organisation, and are only allowed to enter the EP 
unaccompanied if they are registered. In essence, 
the transparency register reveals who is seeking 
to influence European legislation. However, to 
use an obvious example, knowing that a company 
with  a  representation  in  Brussels  seeks  to 
influence legislation does not exactly come as a 
surprise. In addition, every MEP can  sign in a 
non-registered lobbyist as an individual visitor. 
Real transparency means knowing which pieces 
of  legislation  the  listed  and  non -listed 
organisations/individuals  sought  to  influence, 
                                                       
3  European  Parliament,  Debates,  23  March  2011 
(tinyurl.com/EPBuzek). 
4  See  M.  Kluger  Rasmussen  (2011),  “Lobbying  in  the 
European  Parliament:  A  necessary  evil”,  CEPS  Policy 
Brief No. 242, CEPS, Brussels, May. 
5 See europa.eu/transparency-register/index_en.htm 
and  through  which  channels.  The  transparency 
register does not therefore suffice. 
Second, the first-ever code of conduct for MEPs 
was prepared by a working group and approved 
by  the  Conference  of  Presidents  on  the 
recommendation of the  Bureau on 7  July 2011.6 
The code of conduct was forwarded to the AFCO 
committee and debated in three sessions.7 By and 
large,  there  was  broad  agreement  on  a  swift 
adoption and members saw no need for sweeping 
changes.  Leaving  aside  sanctions  of  gross 
misconduct, the code as it s tands at the moment 
regulates what gifts or benefits MEPs may accept 
and  how  they  need  to  declare  remunerated 
activities.  That MEPs  receive certain  gifts  is a 
matter  of  course,  and  to  what  extent  it  is 
appropriate  for  them  to  pursue  remunerated 
activities  in addition to their mandate may be 
controversial,8  but  its  admissibility  is  not 
questioned  here.  However,  it  is  not  e asy  to 
determine  if  a  specific  remunerated  activity 
represents a conflict of interest or not. For this, we 
would  need  to  know  whether  remunerated 
activity, access, and legislative activity are closely 
linked, which the provisions of the current draft 
do not allow. The transparency component of the 
draft code of conduct is thus not satisfactory. 
Therefore,  if  the  code  of  conduct  is  not 
substantially  amended,  the  two  initiatives  will 
prove  toothless  with  regard  to  achieving 
transparency  and  will  convey  the  image  that 
promises to learn from past scandals were mere 
window-dressing. 
                                                       
6 Chair: Jerzy Buzek (EPP, PL); Vice-Chairs: Diana Wallis 
(ALDE,  UK),  Stavros  Lambrinidis  (S&D,  UK);  Other 
members:  Jan  Zahradil  (ECR,  CZ),  Claude  Turmes 
(Greens/EFA,  LU),  Alejo  Vidal-Quadras  (EPP,  ES), 
Francesco  Speroni  (EFD,  IT),  Cornelis  (Dennis)  de  Jong 
(GUE/NGL, NL), Manfred Weber (EPP, DE), Maria Badia 
i Cutchet (S&D, ES). 
7 On 28 September, 5 October and 11 October 2011.Videos 
of  the  latter  two  sessions  are  available  at 
tinyurl.com/AFCOvideo.  The  legislative  footprint  was 
not mentioned once. 
8 A. Willis (2011), “Anti-corruption campaigner calls time 
on  MEP  „parallel‟  jobs”,  EUObserver,  24  March  2011 
(euobserver.com/9/32047). A CALL TO MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT | 3 
 
The missing link: The legislative 
footprint 
In isolation, the effect of the transparency register 
and  the  code  of  conduct  will  fizzle  out  –  a 
scenario that the legislative footprint would help 
prevent. The legislative footprint is a document 
that would detail the time, person and content of 
a  legislator‟s  contact  with  a  stakeholder. 
Published  as  an  annex  to  legislative  reports,  it 
would provide insight into who gave input into 
draft legislation. 
The  legislative  footprint  complements  the 
transparency register by allowing insight into who 
sought to influence what piece of legislation. The 
transparency  register  merely  generically 
addresses  the  first  question  and  only  partially 
answers  it.  In  contrast,  the  addition  of  a 
legislative  footprint  would  extend  the  scope  of 
actors  covered  to  non-registered  interest 
representatives, and all contacts could be linked 
to  specific  legislation.  By  knowing  who  a 
company‟s  representatives  talked  to,  in  what 
legislative  context,  and  how  often,  media  and 
citizens can obtain a much clearer picture of what 
is happening inside the EP. Who actually sought 
to influence a specific piece of legislation can thus 
only  be  known  if  a  legislative  footprint  is 
adopted. 
The legislative footprint would also address the 
shortcomings  in  the  code  of  conduct.  Standing 
alone, the code of conduct only tells us what an 
MEP earns outside Parliament, for example, but 
does  not  allow  an  assessment  of  whether  this 
influences  their  legislative  activity.  Here  the 
footprint would kick in. If citizens can see that the 
MEP  is  being  lobbied  heavily  by  a  specific 
company or sector, related remunerated activity 
may  provide  an  opportunity  to  question  the 
relationship between an MEP and a stakeholder. 
Likewise, if an MEP only receives representatives 
of a company for which they conduct consultancy 
work, this would provide an opportunity to ask 
questions. In short, the legislative footprint would 
have a preventive effect in leading MEPs to take 
the  public  impression  into  account,  possibly 
recalibrating the meetings and commitments they 
accept. Whether there is actually privileged access 
to an MEP related to their remunerated activity 
can  again  only  be  assessed  if  a  legislative 
footprint is adopted. 
Hence, the legislative footprint would empower 
the transparency register and code of conduct by 
enabling their real purpose. The failure of the EP 
leadership to introduce a footprint is particularly 
remarkable  against  the  backdrop  of  a  plenary 
decision of May 2011, instructing the Bureau to 
implement  it.  When  the  EP  adopted  the 
transparency register, it demanded 
that its Bureau devise a system whereby all 
lobbyists  who  fall  within  the  scope  of  the 
register  and  who  have  obtained  a  meeting 
with  a  relevant  Member  about  a  specific 
legislative  dossier  are  recorded  as  having 
done so in the explanatory memorandum to 
the report or recommendation relating to the 
relevant draft legislative act.9 
The question as to why the EP leadership failed to 
deliver on this  request  leads  us to consider the 
more substantive opposition to the footprint. 
Counter-arguments do not hold water 
The  arguments  against  the  legislative  footprint 
are easily dismantled. Two of them are deemed to 
be  particularly  relevant.  First,  a  legislative 
footprint might prevent MEPs from meeting their 
constituents. Second, it might increase lobbyism 
by providing a reference to public affairs agencies 
and lobby groups. Both criticisms are unfounded. 
In contrast, opposition to the legislative footprint 
can perhaps be explained by the fact that it brings 
MEPs out of their comfort zone.  
First, the legislative footprint does not prevent an 
MEP  from  meeting  anyone.  It  merely  requires 
that a record of the meeting be kept. This is not 
convincing as a genuine reason for rejecting the 
footprint, and  does not  qualify as anything  but 
pretextual. 
Second,  the  footprint  might  increase  lobbying 
attempts, some hypothesise, as it could provide 
evidence  for  stakeholders  that  they  have  done 
their  work.  But  an  increase  in  stakeholder 
contacts is a good thing. The legitimacy of the EP 
partly  rests  on  its  wide  consultation  with 
stakeholders,  particularly  in  view  of  dwindling 
voter turnout. Interest representatives do have a 
role  in  the  pluralistic  European  Union.  MEPs 
                                                       
9  European  Parliament  decision  of  11  May  2011  on 
conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between the 
European Parliament and the Commission on a common 
Transparency Register (see tinyurl.com/EPdecision). 4 | LUKAS OBHOLZER 
 
should hear different positions in order to form 
their own opinions.  
The  arguments  advanced  against  the  legislative 
footprint are thus not valid.  
An essential device for transparency and 
legitimacy 
In  fact,  the  legislative  footprint  is  a  powerful 
signalling and screening device for the EP as an 
institution, for individual MEPs, and the public in 
general.  It  would  not  only  improve  internal 
transparency  but  also  the  legitimacy  of  EU 
legislative  output.  In  addition  to  strengthening 
the  EP,  this  would  provide  tangible  benefits  to 
individual MEPs in their work.  
The  legitimisation  and  improvement  of  the 
quality  of  EU  legislative  output  are  part  and 
parcel  of  the  raison  d‟￪tre  of  the  European 
Parliament.  Most  recently,  the  EP  gained  new 
powers under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. However, 
the legitimacy of output has come under scrutiny 
and criticism, as the  vast majority of  legislative 
acts under the ordinary legislative procedure are 
adopted as first-reading agreements (72 % in the 
2009-2014  term).10  Consequently,  agreement 
between  Council  and  the  EP  is  reached  in 
informal  trilogues  with  the  European 
Commission  prior  to  the  first  reading.  T his 
implies  a  “shift  of  legislative  decision-making 
from  public  inclusive  to  restricted  secluded 
arenas”11 and involves delegation of negotiation 
mandates to actors deliberating on behalf of the 
EP. The preparation and passing of legislation can 
thus be likened to decision-making in a market 
with  imperfect  information.  First  committee 
members, and then the plenary need to decide on 
whether to support the deals or not. This applies 
despite  their  not  being  part  of  the  actual 
negotiation,  not  necessarily  comprehending  the 
technical detail of a dossier, and time constraints 
which  hardly  allow  making  individually 
informed  decisions.  Therefore,  MEPs  delegate 
certain  responsibilities  to  committees,  and  in 
committees  to  the  chair,  the  rapporteur  and 
                                                       
10  R.  Corbett,  F.  Jacobs  and  M.  Shackleton  (2011),  The 
European Parliament, Brussels: John Harper Publishing, p. 
240. 
11 For more information, see the homepage of the research 
project on Informal Politics of Co-Decision, headed by Dr 
Christine Reh (ucl.ac.uk/spp/research/esrc-project).  
shadow  rapporteur,  as  well  as  the  party  group 
coordinators.  
But due to asymmetric information it is hard for 
any individual MEP to assess whether a specific 
deal  is  good,  let  alone  the  best  possible  deal. 
Signalling  and  screening  have  long  been 
identified as mechanisms to overcome, or at least 
mediate,  asymmetric  information.  One  would 
expect  that  MEPs  might  welcome  every 
opportunity to improve their situation.  
Firstly,  the  legislative  footprint  is  a  screening 
device  allowing  an  assessment  of  which 
stakeholders a key MEP met, received, and heard 
from while drawing up legislation. This benefits 
internal EP transparency. 
In  the  EU  political  system  at  large,  this  would 
help to identify asymmetrical lobbying. Financial 
industry influence has been highlighted before as 
a case of this – a cross-party alliance of MEPs on 
the  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs  Committee 
therefore  initiated  „Finance  Watch‟  in  order  to 
provide  alternative  analysis  on  financial 
regulation.12  In  short,  imbalances  in  input  can 
thus be identified. 
For the public, it means that citizens can gain 
insight  into  who  sought  to  influence  the 
legislation impacting on their lives. Beyond the 
identification of conflicts of interest and biases in 
access, it provides citizens with an opportunity to 
hold their representatives to account. In the long 
run,  the  footprin t  might  have  even  more 
beneficial  implications:  MEPs  might  be 
questioned, or might wish to explain themselves, 
as  to  why  they  held  some  meetings  and  not 
others. To the extent that this might happen, the 
legislative footprint would transform the EP and 
improve debate in the European public sphere 
between citizens and their representatives. 
For  individual  MEPs,  the  legislative  footprint 
would constitute a helpful tool in their task of 
assessing the legislative behaviour of, and deals 
struck  by,  their  colleagu es.  It  would  mediate 
concerns  about  the  informal  developments 
towards  early  agreements  in  providing  MEPs 
with insight into who their colleagues consulted, 
and the possibility to more easily question the 
results  and  interests  involved.  Thus,  it  also 
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reinforces  transparency  among  the 
representatives themselves.  
Secondly,  the  legislative  footprint  is  a  device 
signalling the informed nature and strong basis – 
in other words: the legitimacy – of a position to 
the other institutions, fellow MEPs, and citizens. 
Putting data on stakeholder consultations into the 
public  domain  will  show  that  MEPs 
comprehensively  consult  interests,  thus 
bolstering  the  legitimacy  of  the  EP  and  EU 
legislative output in line with the classic role of 
the EP. 
For  individual  MEPs,  the  footprint  is  an 
opportunity to signal to their constituency what 
they care about.  They can thus  show  how they 
take  citizens‟  concerns  seriously,  and  how  they 
work hard to achieve good legislation. 
For  the  EP  as  a  whole,  the  information  from 
legislative footprints can signal to the European 
Commission  and  the  Council  the  solid 
foundations  of  its  position.  Having  consulted 
stakeholders,  the  bargaining  position  of  the  EP 
vis-à-vis  the  other  institutions  is  strengthened. 
MEPs have long worked to set the EP in a sound 
position,  so  it  is  unclear  why  they  would  stop 
now. 
At the same time, the legislative footprint could 
help the EP establish some transparency for co-
decision early agreements by helping mediate the 
concerns of MEPs and the public, thus boosting 
confidence  in  the  legislative  procedure  and  its 
openness.  In  the  long  run,  moreover,  these 
dynamics  might  push  stakeholder  consultations 
from secluded arenas to fact-finding hearings in 
committee  or  online  consultations,13  instead  of 
every MEP struggling on their o wn. Thus, the 
footprint might streamline interest representation 
and make it more efficient.  
How could this be achieved? 
Application: Precedent and practice 
The legislative footprint would take the shape of 
an  annex  to  legislative  reports  that  details  who 
key  parliamentary  actors  met,  received,  and 
heard  from  while  drafting  legislative  texts. 
However, its scope leaves much room for political 
manoeuvre.  This  section  seeks  to  flesh  out 
                                                       
13 See Kluger Rasmussen, op. cit. 
precedent,  current  practice  and  the  potential  of 
the footprint. 
In  order  to  outline  the  scope  of  an  effective 
legislative  footprint,  three  questions  are 
instrumental: 
1)  What  qualifies  as  a  ‘meeting’  or  contact? 
Meetings  inside  and  outside  the  EP,  with 
registered  and  non-registered  lobbyists, need to 
be  included  in  the  scope  of  the  footprint.  If 
deemed substantial, similar contacts by phone or 
correspondence should be included too. Would it 
not be a double standard if different rules applied 
to meetings in the Parliament and the Place du 
Luxembourg, one of the hubs of lobbying activity 
in  Brussels?  Or  if  different  rules  applied  to  a 
lobbyist being signed in to the Parliament by an 
MEP  for  an  appointment  and  those  entering 
independently after registration?  
2)  Who  qualifies  as  a  ‘relevant’  MEP?  Ideally 
every  committee  member,  as  they  have  the 
opportunity  to  table  amendments.  At  a 
minimum,  the  committee  chair,  the  rapporteur 
and  shadow  rapporteurs  as  those  involved  in 
drafting  a  report,  and  coordinators  as  those 
influencing  voting  decisions  of  groups  should 
provide  footprints.  These  members  are  also 
usually  involved  in  trilogue  negotiations.  They 
would  thus  need  to  disclose  information  on 
meetings. Would, in any different context, these 
actors deny that they are „relevant‟ in drawing up 
legislation? Of course, it should be welcomed if 
MEPs  or  groups  systematically  published  data 
going beyond that requirement. 
3) Who qualifies as a ‘lobbyist’? In addition to 
those  registered  and  non-registered  interest 
representatives  in  principle  covered  by  register, 
one  group  of  lobbyists  enters  and  exits  the  EP 
without  being  affected  by  the  transparency 
register – member state officials, and to a lesser 
extent,  third-country  officials.  Who  would 
question  the  fact  that  meetings  of  the  UK 
Permanent  Representation  with  MEPs  working 
on financial regulation should be treated similarly 
to  those  of  other  interest  representatives? 
Member state and third-country officials are thus 
lobbyists  vis-à-vis  the  EP  and  meetings  with 
MEPs  should  accordingly  be  recorded  in  the 
framework of the footprint. 
These  assessments  outlining  the  scope  of  the 
footprint are not pulled out of thin air but rest on 6 | LUKAS OBHOLZER 
 
current  practice  that  provides  evidence  of  their 
feasibility. In a 2008 Resolution, the Parliament  
acknowledges that a rapporteur may, as he or 
she  sees  fit  (on  a  voluntary  basis),  use  a 
“legislative  footprint”,  i.e.  an  indicative  list, 
attached  to  a  Parliamentary  report,  of 
registered  interest  representatives  who  were 
consulted  and  had  significant  input  during 
the  preparation  of  the  report;  considers  it 
particularly  advisable  that  such  a  list  be 
included in legislative reports.14 
Against  this  backdrop,  MEPs  advocating 
transparency,  such  as  Diana  Wallis,  have 
previously  provided  footprints.15  Wallis  also 
included  Permanent  Representations,  thus 
accounting  for  the  fact  that  these  constitute 
lobbyists vis-à-vis MEPs. 
British  conservatives  have  published  their 
meetings with interest representatives in so-called 
lobbying contact reports, even though the quality 
of the data differs from member to member and 
has been published on a six -monthly basis only. 
This is a good start but does not go far enough.16 
Most  important,  these  cases  show  that  where 
there‟s a will, there‟s a way: these MEPs and their 
staff  have  accomplished  more  in  terms  of 
administrative  effort  than  would  be  required 
today.  
Ever since the scandal, even registered lobbyists 
entering the EP premises need to request a day 
pass. Most of the administrative burden could be 
carried by technology, if interest representatives 
were required to state the purpose of their visit to 
the EP. A bit of effort is required, though. Since 
not  all  contacts  take  place  in  the  EP,  and  since 
also  representatives  of  states  and  individually 
signed-in lobbyists should fall under the scope of 
the  footprint,  the  information  electronically 
gathered  would  need  to  be  complemented  by 
MEPs  and  their  staff.  But  would  transparency 
and a strong signal to citizens not be worth this 
effort  on  the  part  of  MEPs  and  their  teams? 
Would  keeping  a  list  of  government 
representatives  and  lobbyists  granted  meetings 
                                                       
14 European Parliament resolution of 8 May 2008 on the 
development  of  the  framework  for  the  activities  of 
interest  representatives  (lobbyists)  in  the  European 
institutions; OJ C 271E , 12.11.2009, pp. 48–51 (link).  
15 For an example, see tinyurl.com/WallisFootprint. 
16 For an example, see tinyurl.com/ToriesReport. 
really  represent  an  insurmountable 
administrative burden? 
In sum, the legislative footprint needs a group of 
enterprising  MEPs  who  will  seize  this 
opportunity  now.  As  I  argue  below,  this  is  not 
only an idealistic quest for better policy-making 
at EU level that should be embraced by all pro-
European forces, but is also sensible from a party 
political point of view.  
A moment for true leadership: A 
roadmap to a more transparent EP 
Until  27  October  2011,  amendments  could  be 
tabled in the AFCO committee, with the vote in 
committee scheduled for mid-November. Several 
of its members stressed the fundamental symbolic 
significance of the code of conduct as a signal to 
citizens that MEPs care about transparency and 
the  urgency  of  the  matter.  The  legislative 
footprint  would  combine  symbolic  power  and 
substantive  impact  by  enhancing  transparency 
and legitimacy. 
By adopting this measure, the EP would position 
itself as a vanguard of transparency. To lead on 
this issue, MEPs and EP leadership should speak 
up for the matter. The obligation towards citizens 
as nicely encapsulated by Jerzy Buzek‟s statement 
at  the  outset  of  the  article  should  suffice  as 
motivation.  
But  more  than  that,  a  vote  on  the  legislative 
footprint  would  be  a  gift  to  the  EP‟s  political 
groups.  By  calling  for  a  roll-call  vote,  they  can 
force others to show how serious they are about 
promises  to  achieve  transparency.  Given  the 
salience  of  the  issue,  candidates  for  leadership 
positions  at  the  mid-term  re-shuffle  should 
position themselves clearly. 
Furthermore,  in  forcing  a  roll-call  vote  on  the 
issue, the 2014 European elections might  find a 
real EU-level issue that MEPs and party groups 
can campaign with. Given the widely held views 
about opacity and corruption at the EU level, the 
issue  resonates  well  with  the  electorate.  MEPs 
who oppose this step would need to explain to 
the electorate why they oppose this transparency.  
Failure  to  step  up  to  the  opportunity  would 
suggest  a  cartelisation  of  actors  in  the  EP,  and 
raise  suspicion  about  whether  the  EP  and  its 
leadership  structures  are  able  to  regulate 
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footprint  as  spelled  out  here,  the  EP  could 
become a leader on transparency in the EU.  
Conclusion: A call upon MEPs  
This Policy Brief therefore calls upon Jerzy Buzek, 
and those who wish to succeed him, the leaders 
of the political groups, the members of the AFCO 
committee  and  their  colleagues  who  voted  in 
favour of the footprint on 11 May 2011 to act on 
the  Parliament‟s  promise  to  embrace  real 
transparency  by  adopting  the  legislative 
footprint.  If  pro-European  parties  and  their 
leaderships accept this proposal, they will send a 
strong  message  to  citizens  that  they  take 
transparency  and  their  obligations  to  the 
electorate seriously. CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Place du Congrès 1, B‐1000 Brussels, Belgium  
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